CHARLES MATSEKE | The un-becoming of an ethical and capable developmental state

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Charles Matseke

25 March 2026 | 13:00

What we are dealing with is not isolated corruption. It is a bureaucratically rigid system. A criminal and cartel network. A political economy of looting, writes Charles Matseke.

CHARLES MATSEKE | The un-becoming of an ethical and capable developmental state

Parliament’s ad hoc committee probing police corruption. Picture: Parliament

South Africa is not failing to become a developmental state. It is un-becoming one.
The National Development Plan (NDP) Vision 2030 promised a capable, ethical state that could drive industrialisation, coordinate development, and lift millions out of poverty.
Today, with fewer than four years left to that deadline, that promise reads less like a roadmap and more like a relic.
This is no longer about slow progress. It is about regression and the quiet privatisation of the republic.
What is emerging is not just state weakness, but something far more dangerous: a parallel/shadow state; a system of extraction operating within, alongside and sometimes above the formal institutions of government.
We have seen this before. The Zondo Commission exposed it. The Madlanga Commission is confirming it in real time.
What we are dealing with is not isolated corruption. It is a bureaucratically rigid system. A criminal and cartel network. A political economy of looting.
Tender mafias. Tender engineers. Political brokers. Administrative gatekeepers.
Names are no longer whispers. They are now part of the public record; Morgan Maumela, Vusimuzi 'Cat' Matlala, Thabo Bester and a growing ecosystem of actors who have turned the state into a black marketplace.
The testimony emerging from the Tshwane tender investigations is particularly instructive.
Ad hoc payment systems were allegedly used to bypass formal controls, with companies such as Gubis85 Solutions receiving tens of millions of rand outside standard procurement frameworks.
A “tender web” of political collusion reportedly involved senior municipal officials and representatives from multiple political parties, sharing “preferred lists” of companies to ensure predetermined outcomes.
Non-compliant bidders were paid millions despite failing basic requirements, indicating not just administrative failure but deliberate subversion.
Unauthorised deployments of security services and the approval of irregular expenditures point to a collapse of internal controls. Perhaps most disturbingly, attempts were allegedly made to secure contracts for a non-existent municipality.
The level of brazenness that speaks to a culture of impunity rather than isolated corruption lives on. This is not corrupt governance. It is organised crime extraction.
The evolution of corruption in South Africa has entered a new phase. Under single-party dominance, corruption often followed hierarchical lines; often centralised, controlled and politically managed. Under coalition governance, however, corruption appears to have decentralised and diversified.
What we are now witnessing is not the monopolisation of state resources, but their fragmentation across competing political actors. Power-sharing, in some instances, has become indistinguishable from loot-sharing.
This is particularly evident in municipalities such as Tshwane, where testimony suggests that different political factions may have coordinated rather than competed in accessing procurement benefits.
The implication is profound: corruption is no longer a by-product of political dysfunction, it is becoming a mechanism of political stability within fragmented governance systems.
The involvement of security institutions in these networks represents a critical tipping point.
When members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and municipal law enforcement structures are implicated in procurement irregularities, the consequences extend beyond financial loss. They strike at the heart of the state’s ability to enforce accountability.
If those tasked with upholding the law are themselves beneficiaries of irregular contracts, the entire oversight system collapses. The result is a governance vacuum, one in which rules exist on paper but are selectively applied, ignored or manipulated in practice.
Equally alarming is the alleged role of senior financial officials in facilitating irregular processes. The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is meant to serve as the primary guardian of public funds. A critical checkpoint in ensuring compliance and accountability. When that office is compromised, the consequences are diabolical.
The reported involvement of Tshwane’s financial leadership in enabling non-compliant bids suggests not just institutional weakness, but institutional capture at the highest administrative level. It signals that the mechanisms designed to prevent corruption are not merely failing, but they are being repurposed to enable it.
Tshwane is not just another municipality. It is the administrative capital of the Republic. A symbolic centre of state authority. What happens there resonates far beyond its municipal boundaries.
The spectacle of widespread corruption in such a setting sends a powerful message: that governance in South Africa is negotiable, that accountability is optional, and that public resources are contestable spoils.
The consequences are tangible:
Service delivery deteriorates as funds are diverted from essential infrastructure to irregular contracts. Investor confidence declines, as governance risks increase, and institutional reliability erodes.
Public trust collapses, reinforcing a cycle of disengagement and disillusionment.
The absurdity of attempting to tender for a “ghost municipality” is not just anecdotal. It is emblematic and further exposes the brazenness of elite impunity. It reflects a system in which the perpetrators of corruption feel sufficiently insulated to abandon even the pretence of plausibility.
The concept of a developmental state rests on a fundamental premise: that the state is capable of coordinating resources in the public interest. But what happens when the state itself becomes a site of contestation and extraction?
South Africa’s current trajectory suggests a troubling answer. The developmental state is not being delayed, it is being structurally undermined.
Parallel governance networks do not simply coexist with formal institutions; they hollow them out, redirect their functions, and repurpose their resources. Over time, the formal state becomes performative, retaining its legal and symbolic authority but losing its operational capacity.
If South Africa is to reverse this trajectory, incremental reforms will not suffice. What is required is a fundamental reassertion of institutional integrity.
This means:
Rebuilding financial oversight systems with real independence and enforcement capacity.
Depoliticising procurement processes and insulating them from factional influence.
Strengthening investigative bodies such as the Hawks/NPA/IDAC/PKTT and ensuring that referrals lead to prosecution, not delay.
Re-establishing ethical leadership, where accountability is not selective but systemic.
Most importantly, it requires recognising that the crisis is not merely administrative but political.
South Africa once spoke of becoming a developmental state. Today, it must confront the reality of un-becoming.
The danger is not simply that the state is failing to meet its developmental goals. It is that the very structures required to achieve those goals are being systematically eroded.
A developmental state cannot emerge from a system where governance is commodified, accountability is negotiated, and public institutions are repurposed for private gain.
The question is no longer whether South Africa will achieve Vision 2030.
The question is whether the state, in its current form, still possesses the capacity and the will to govern in the public interest at all.
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